

# **Institutional Development of Peace Support Training Centre's: Best Practice and Lessons for the Rwanda Peace Academy**

## **Introduction**

This policy paper examines the development of Peace Support Training Centres (PSTCs) in Africa with a view to informing the on-going institutional development of the Rwanda Peace Academy (RPA). This paper analyses current approaches to developing PSTCs in Africa and provides recommendations for the development of the RPA.

This paper draws lessons and best practice from the Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana and the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) in Kenya. Desk research was conducted on KAIPTC and by email with relevant staff. A number of interviews were conducted at IPSTC as well as desk research. The following analysis examines the conceptual foundations, history and development of both KAIPTC and IPSTC with a view to providing recommendations for the RPA on institutional development, systems of training and organisation.

## **Conceptual Foundations of PSTCs**

PSTCs in Africa seek to train military officers, civilians and police officers to participate in Peace Support Operations (PSO). These individuals should go on to participate in UN operations, AU missions and other initiatives under the auspices of a regional organisation such as a regional standby brigade of deployment under a Regional Economic Community such as ECOWAS or the EAC. The intent is to equip individuals with specific skills and knowledge so that they may be able to undertake tasks within a specific position. For instance a military officer may deploy to a UN mission as a staff officer in a Force Headquarters or as a sector commander in an AU mission. A civilian may become a civil affairs officer in a UN peacekeeping mission or a political officer in an AU mission and police can deploy within a formed unit or as advisers to national police departments and so on.

PSO is used in the context of regional PSTCs to refer to a variety of different conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction initiatives. Therefore the remit of PSO training centres is extremely broad and applies to a number of different scenarios.

Conflict prevention can include initiatives such as early warning systems, preventative diplomacy, conflict analysis and dialogue, negotiation and mediation. This element of PSO training is extremely difficult to develop practical training for conflict prevention as it is un-measurable. That is, how can one factually determine that conflict has been avoided from preventative activities. Furthermore prevention is usually limited to high level actors and less likely to apply to operational level missions and individuals. The AU is a

good example. The AU has an crucial conflict prevention component constituted of the panel of the wise, the AU General Assembly, the PSOD and eminent persons nominated on an ad hoc basis. Individuals within these departments are of an extremely high level and are unlikely to be trained by PSTCs. Low level prevention activities such as negotiating between warring factions, securing humanitarian access, pre-emptive military responses and the development of quality stabilisation plans are important prevention activities however and this should be reflected in conflict prevention focussed training courses.

Conflict Management applies to activities such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions that seek to address and stop conflict after violence has erupted. UN and AU peacekeeping missions are central to this issue. This should remain the priority of PSO training centres as the UN, AU and African states that contribute personnel to these missions need quality training courses. Training then should focus on skills required for participating in a mission, whether military, civilian or police.

Post-conflict reconstruction is a final area of training and applies to initiatives seeking to assist the transition from conflict to sustainable peace. The UN is the leading actor in post-conflict activities whereas the AU has limited ability to conduct peacebuilding initiatives. Areas such as stabilisation, developing livelihoods and socio-economic recovery, DDR and SSR etc can all be considered post-conflict activities, even if in reality dividing lines are absent or blurred.

These broad areas of conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction are common to all PSTCs even if labels differ. In reality of course these areas are not separate phases and prevention, management and reconstruction interventions do not occur sequentially or in any linear fashion and more often than not occur simultaneously. This is crucial to bare in mind when designing courses and for institutional development.

### **The Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Centre (KAIPTC)**

KAIPTC is the most developed PSTC in Africa and thus provides a useful case to examine. The centre is based in Accra in Ghana and is the designated ECOWAS PSO training centres. Since inception KAIPTC has trained over 11,000 individuals in PSO activities. KAIPTC is accredited to the UN, AU and ECOWAS.

### **History**

Plans for developing KAIPTC began in 1998 and was officially opened in 2000. A site was designated by the Government of Ghana in close proximity to Ghana Armed Forces Training centres in the Teshie region of Accra. Initially plans were to base KAIPTC in the Ho area but these were scrapped in favour

of locating the centre closer to national military establishments and to international partners diplomatic and other representation in the capital.

KAIPTC hosts an impressive infrastructure, all of which has been funded by foreign donor finance. Construction was established through several phases with the Governments of Germany and the UK funding the initial two phases. Other donors were quick to provide support after initial construction of the infrastructure and delivery of initial courses. The first phase of construction was completed in 2003 and KAIPTC delivered its first course, a DDR course, in November 2003. The second phase of the building project at the centre, which was funded by the UK, Italy and the Dutch governments, was completed in 2006.

After basic infrastructure, management structure, curriculum and staff levels had been completed or installed, donors continued to support the Centre in several ways such as cash injections directly into the Centre's budget, provision of equipment (IT, vehicles, flags etc), funding or delivery of specific courses, seconding Technical Advisors for training or management and further construction projects. The UK, due to domestic financial concerns, pulled all of its funding and secondments from KAIPTC in favour of similar projects in East and Southern Africa in 2009. However, a host of other nations have picked up the slack with support in 2010 coming from Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UN and the US. Germany alone has invested over EUR6 million since 2000. Since the Centre's inception donors have contributed nearly USD\$20 million. Since then the government of Ghana has ramped up financial contributions and now provides 70% of funds for KAIPTC.

### **Institutional Organization**

KAPITC has four stated objectives: 1) to contribute to the development of regional and sub-regional capacity in the delivery of integrated peace support operations; 2) to enhance regional and sub-regional capacity for conflict prevention, management, resolution and peace building; 3) to enhance understanding of critical peace and security in West Africa in particular and the continent as a whole; 4) to create an effective, efficient and sustainable management and support arrangements for the KAIPTC

In terms of organisation KAIPTC has developed from a purely national training centre into a regional organisation under an international management board. The organisation's core departments comprise a training department, research department and admin department.

In 2006 KAIPTC established an international management board. Although KAIPTC is a designated international organisation, in practise the Government of Ghana has final say over strategy and operations. The international management board comprises:

- Minister for Defence, Ghana (Chair)
- Dep. Minister of Foreign Affairs & Regional Integration, Ghana
- Chief of Defence Staff, Ghana
- Inspector General of Police, Ghana
- Commandant, KAIPTC
- President, ECOWAS Commission
- United Nations Resident Coordinator
- Ghana, Director, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD)
- University of Ghana
- Representative of a Civil Society Organisation in Ghana
- Representatives of Development Partners (France, Germany, Denmark, USA)
- Chief Director, Ministry of Defence (Secretary)

Training and courses at KAIPTC covers three broad areas of 1) Peace Support Areas, 2) Conflict Management and 3) Peace and Security Studies. This approach has been developed out of different phases of KAIPTC's development and reflects a learning aspect of the centre and the regular assessments provided by the management board and staff. Initially KAIPTC focused on conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction. However, although these issues are included in specific courses the organization of the centre now focuses more clearly on practical and relevant training for PSOs. A key example is the rejection of the use of the Carana scenario as proposed by the UN due to inapplicability and lack of relevance. This indicates that KAIPTC plays an important role in institutional strategizing and design. Similarly the course calendar for 2017 constitutes practical and relevant courses for contemporary PSOs that include courses such as multidimensional PSO, police management, planning, logistics, civil-military coordination, DDR, stabilisation, political adviser, crisis information management, sexual exploitation, SALW, human rights in PSO, rule of law, election management, and justice as well as a small number of more theoretical and analytical courses such as conflict analysis, mediation and protection of civilians.

Most training activities are funded by external donors. KAIPTC has been able to influence some aspects incrementally such as by assisting writing boards, providing and sourcing subject matter experts and through the management board. However for the most part training activities are dominated by external actors and donors have disproportionate influence over course content.

The system of training at KAIPTC is negatively influenced by external dominance, although the centre is better than others at steering training. Courses are funded by outside and external individuals are sourced to provide individual lectures. This leads to duplication of content and an uncoordinated courses that can lack relevance. Surprisingly there is a disconnect from training and research at KAIPTC. The research department does not

participate in training to a significant degree, which is a missed opportunity. However as KAIPTC has expanded and matured the centre has had more of a say in course content and delivery, as can be seen by a re-focused training calendar.

## **International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC)**

IPSTC in Kenya is the most developed PSTC in Eastern Africa. The Centre has an impressive infrastructure over two sites in Nairobi and hosts over 100 training courses a year at both operational and tactical levels. IPSTC is also the principle training centre for the EASF and has been accredited to the UN DPKO and UN Integrated training System (ITS).

### **History**

IPSTC was initially Kenya's national peacekeeping training centre, within the Kenyan Defence and Staff College (DFC) in Karen. The Centre provided national pre-deployment training for the Kenya Defence Force (KDF) before they were sent to participate in UN peacekeeping missions.

Plans for a regional PSO training centre began in 2001. From 2004 donors began to provide support to the PSTC with a view of developing regional peacekeeping capability. The majority of the PSTCs initial funding was from the UK and Germany.

At the same time the AU was established under the Constitutive Act in 2003 ushering a new and more proactive era of peace operations in Africa. The AU's nascent conflict management components included a PSO department, modelled on the UN DPKO, and plans for regional reaction brigades under the ASF. These elements and individuals require competent staff members who in turn need relevant and appropriate training.

The centre was rebranded IPSTC and construction of facilities took place between 2004-2007, mainly funded by the UK and Germany. In addition a UK funded de-mining centre began to coordinate courses with IPSTC under UK direction.

From 2008 IPSTC entered into a process of integration and internationalisation. KMOSD took the decision (almost unilaterally) to declare IMATC a Kenyan institution and it was subsumed officially under IPSTC. Both IPSTC and IMATC began to deliver and institutionalise courses for a regional audience. At least 60% of all students on IPSTC courses are from EASF member states. A second rebranding phase took place creating an umbrella organization with two campuses. The Karen campus was named the Peace and Conflict Studies School (PCSS) with a focus on operational level training and Embakasi was branded the Humanitarian Peace Support School (HPSS) with a lower focus of tactical level training.

## **Institutional Organisation**

IPSTC aims to 'conduct training, education and research, informing military, police and civilian personnel in all aspects of peace support operations in order to promote effectiveness of the response to complex emergencies'. The centre is split into an operational training campus and tactical level campus, overseen by a head quarters. A research department, the Peace and Security Research Department (PSRD) has also been developed. The headquarters, PCSS and the PSRD are all co-located in Karen in Nairobi.

It is crucial to state that *all* activities at IPSTC are externally funded. Financial statements indicate a significant contribution by the Kenyan MoD to the tune of around USD2 million. However this only covers the salaries of KDF seconded to the centre (which they would receive anyway) and there is no actual contribution to IPSTC from the KMoD. Foreign donors pay for every single activity the centre undertakes.

The highest decision making organ is the bi-annual Joint Control Board (JCB), consisting of donors and sponsors and the Kenyan Ministry of Defence. The Kenyan Assistant CDF is chair of the JCB along with 14 other members, all of who are external funders who have signed a Memorandum of Commitment to IPSTC. Current members are Australia, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Japan, Canada, the UK, the USA, Kenya, Germany, UNDP, Switzerland and UN Women. No AU, EASF or regional representatives are part of the JCB.

Below the JCB is the director, a Kenyan Brigadier. However all key management positions are staffed by foreign secondees and Technical Advisers. The head of training department is a Danish Lt Col, the Chief of Staff is a British Lt Col, the S01 Plans and Programmes is a French Lt Col, head of curriculum design is a Canadian Major, head of evaluations is a Swiss Major. It is worth noting that none of these nations participate in multidimensional PSO in Africa in significant numbers. Furthermore all activities at IPSTC are coordinated and implemented by foreign actors. On the one hand external support guarantees significant funding, but on the hand external forces have almost complete say on how IPSTC functions.

Training and courses at IPSTC centre around conflict prevention, conflict management and post-conflict peacebuilding. The centre has two types of courses; owned courses and hosted courses. Hosted courses are delivered in their entirety by external actors such as an NGO or donor who wants an existing infrastructure. The centre has no say over these activities. Owned courses are developed and delivered by IPSTC itself. Currently there are 23 'owned courses' covering a range of areas. The system of training involves a writing board for each course followed by a process of design that lasts several months. In house expertise is prioritized in the delivery of courses. However in practice external SMEs provide most of the instruction. There are

only 3 directing staff who cannot cover all courses nor do they have the requisite expertise or experience to provide quality instruction. KDF staff at IPSTC are numerous, with several KDF officers in the training department. However KDF do not participate in training activities to any significant degree.

The research department is perhaps the most dysfunctional and irrelevant part of IPSTC. Research is completely detached from all activities and products at IPSTC. Researchers do not play a role in course design, nor do they teach on courses. At best the PSRD is PR resource for IPSTC, but the poor quality of research products and the lack of quality personnel is a significant shortcoming and carries reputational risk for the centre. No effective system of research exists at IPSTC and this trend is likely to continue.

IPSTC then functions more akin to a conference centre with limited ability to design and deliver training packages with 'in-house' resources. However, in the last few years IPSTC has made some significant strides forward. Three areas can usefully be highlighted: 1) accreditation, 2) financial management and 3) evaluations.

IPSTC and courses held at the centre have been accredited to the UN DPKO and ITS. This was achieved by developing i) a strategic plan, ii) a detailed human resources manual, iii) a comprehensive financial system and iv) a detailed gender policy. After these steps were achieved a 'tiger team' from the UN DPKO and ITS was sent to IPSTC and they were assessed accordingly.

IPSTC has ensured a detailed, transparent and accountable financial system. A competent financial department with a senior head of finance has been established at IPSTC. The centre conducts regular internal financial audits. Most importantly a detailed external audit is conducted by Price Waterhouse Coopers, providing regular and transparent accounting, that contributes to sustained and increased external funding as well as aiding accreditation.

IPSTC has developed a detailed monitoring and evaluation system. A entire department dedicated to monitoring and evaluations has been developed with hi-tech systems and software. Daily evaluations are conducted as well as After Action Reviews for every course. Furthermore post-course evaluations are conducted after 3 months and fed into the system. However questions remain over to what extent the system effectively feeds into course design and delivery or whether it is used to appease foreign funders.

## **Lessons & Best Practise**

In looking at the case studies of KAIPTC and IPSTC some broad conclusions can be made about developing a PSTC:

**PSTC's take time.** KAIPTC and IPSTC took over a decade to develop, and the process is on-going. Furthermore these PSTC's evolved through several phases. Initial phases concentrated on developing the physical and legal infrastructure as well as delivering a small number of externally funded courses. This phase also includes preliminary engagement with external sponsors. A subsequent phase involves the development of organisational structure with relevant departments and the ability to host and deliver courses as well as greater support from external partners, often involving running costs and secondments. Further phases require a transition to international organisation through the establishment of a Joint Management Board, the development of a system of training, adequate course calendar and ensuring departments are adequately staffed.

**Developing roles and responsibilities is key.** The current approach of PSO training centres is to rely on external funding and external expertise. As such PSTCs have little influence over courses and content. KAIPTC is perhaps best placed and actively tries to maintain some in-house expertise, in part as the government of Ghana is a large financial contributor to the centre. IPSTC is more akin to a conference centre where all deliverables are essentially contracted to external subject matter experts and facilitators. A real opportunity exists for the RPA to 'own' its products by developing a sophisticated yet simple system of training in collaboration with external partners where needed. Similarly with research there is an opportunity to develop a useful and practical system of research that meets a requirement. Research in other PSTCs is entirely disconnected from training. Therefore developing key roles and responsibilities of departments that achieve the aims of the centre is crucial.

**External Funding is Essential.** All PSTCs are externally funded in their entirety, mainly from western states but also international organisations and NGOs. This can take any forms including: funding running costs, funding courses, funding specific departments and seconding Technical Advisers to staff positions. It is crucial to understand that donor money does come with certain strings and agendas such as gaining access to military establishments, diplomatic bargaining chips, justification of aid and so on. Furthermore donors have different funding approaches and can be dictated to by unforeseen internal pressures. For instance the future of US aid for PSO is somewhat uncertain with the new Trump administration, the UK's foreign aid is in an unclear position after BREXIT and the EU is receiving greater scrutiny from its member states. Furthermore donors provide aid in different ways. The US tends to provide TAs and fund and deliver course packages on an ad hoc basis whereas the EU and Japan tend to fund departments, running costs and predictable courses. China provides unconditional funds. Ensuring external funding is essential. Lobbying key partners through diplomatic

(Ambassador/Defence Attaché) networks and channels at home and abroad is part of securing funds as is developing cross donor working groups.

**The Need for Accreditation & Financial Transparency.** It is essential that PSTC's of any quality have accreditation to the UN (DPKO and ITS) and the AU to include the EASF. Ensuring the 4 required criteria of a strategic plan, financial system, human resources manual and gender manual is crucial. In addition a curriculum design department is required. After achieving these elements it is essential to invite the relevant UN and AU departments and persons to the RPA to assess with a view to official accreditation of the centre and courses. The first steps are to engage with relevant stakeholders in the UN and AU systems. The development of a comprehensive, transparent and externally audited financial system is key not only for accreditation but for securing external funding.

### **Developing Systems & Departments for the RPA**

The RPA is a regional PSTC based in Musanze, Rwanda. The RPA is part of the regional and continental architecture for PSO training. It is recognised by the East African Standby Force (EASF) as one of its training institutions, is a member of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC) as well as the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA), and provides the East African Community (EAC) with prison services and correction training for PSO.

Currently the RPA is in embryonic form. The centre hosts a small number of courses per year and the number is increasing. Several donors have supported the RPA, notably the government of Japan, the government of the UK and the UNDP.

The RPA is organised under the Rwandan Ministry of Defence. A Director is the most senior staff member supported by a head of training, a head of research and a head of admin. A Strategic Adviser and Senior Researcher is also part of the RPA (See Annex 1). The RPA has ambitious plans to achieve its aims of becoming a regional centre of excellence in PSO training. The following sections outline organisational considerations for the future development of the RPA.

### **Senior Management**

Ensuring a competent management structure is essential. The most senior decision making organ of a management board of key stakeholders should eventually be established. The management board should be constituted of the host nation's MoD, the director of the centre, key sponsors and key customers such as relevant departments in the UN and AU system, APSTA and relevant regional representation.

Internally the centre needs a competent management structure. The Director is the most senior individual in the centre and is usually drawn from the host nations' defence senior officer corps. The Director should be supported by a Chief of Staff and/or a political/civilian adviser and a plans and programs officer. These senior positions should form the core decision-making nucleus of the centre with oversight of all activities. Beneath them should sit the head of training, head of research and head of admin and finance.

Together the Director and headquarters team with substantive heads of department should form the senior management of the centre. These senior positions must ensure organisational coherence between aims, inputs and activities at the centre. As a priority a comprehensive financial strategy and process of accreditation with relevant organisations should be established.


### **Training Department**

The training department should be the lead component in the delivery of courses. In other PSTC's the training department performs a coordination and administration function, with little bearing on course content or delivery. An effective and coherent system of training does not exist within PSTCs. The existing system is dominated by external actors, both in terms of course content and course delivery. PSTCs rely on external expertise instead of building in-house capacity. Although external actors will continue to be important for PSTCs, centres must ensure ownership through effective training systems and staffing. The Training department should lead on course delivery and play an active role in design and delivery, thus providing crucial ownership for the centre. A simple and effective system of training can be outlined (see Fig.1):

Firstly **courses should be identified**. The training department, along with the headquarters, should secure courses for delivery at the centre. This will inevitably involve partnership with donors on specific courses. An effective and quality training department will help in attracting external support to the centre.

Secondly, after securing a course, a process of **course design** should take place. The training department should again take the lead in partnership with the research department, with support from other components and external expertise where necessary. This involves the convening of writing boards lasting 2-3 days comprising relevant RPA staff from the training and research department, ideally a curriculum designer, and relevant external experts.

Fig 1: Training System



Thirdly **course delivery** should be the core remit of the training department. During course delivery the training department can provide ownership as well as keeping training relevant. One method of ensuring quality course delivery is to have training officers as 'Director of Studies' or 'Course Leader' for each course or at least as a member of the facilitation team. This would ensure: relevant content, effective sequencing of modules, avoid duplication and build in house expertise. Although most modules would need to be delivered by external subject matter experts, training officers as course leaders can play a crucial role in course delivery.

Fourthly detailed **After Action Reviews** must be conducted after every course in order to improve and keep training relevant. The training department, along with other facilitators and a member of the research department and headquarters should take place with tangible recommendations.

Fifthly, an internal process of **validation and evaluation** should take place, with RPA staff members only, as a purely internal function. Again the Training department should lead on this process with representatives of all other components.

A sixth step involves either identifying **new courses or delivering existing courses**. This process should take 5-6 months for each course.

The training department should be the priority component of the centre. Other components such as research and admin must support the training department. After all the core remit of PSTCs is to deliver training.

It is crucial that well qualified staff with relevant expertise and experience are hired. Trainers need to be able to manage training delivery and courses, be able to design courses and have relevant expertise in specific areas of conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding issues. Therefore individuals with 5-10 years of professional experience in these areas, as well as experience of delivering training to adult learners from defence and police forces and government departments. Once a crucial mass of courses are secured at the centre it would be useful to have one trainer responsible for conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding, or whatever labels are applied to training pillars. Trainers should ideally be a mix of military, police and civilian individuals.

The development of the training department should follow the overall development of the centre. Full expansion should not take place until a 'critical mass' of courses have been secured with predictable funding. Until then a small training department consisting of a Head of Training and dedicated training officer will suffice (see Annex 2).

### **Research Department**

The research department in PSTCs should inform the delivery of training. Currently the system of research in PSTCs is acutely flawed and has no impact on training delivery whatsoever. Research conducted at IPSTC and at KAIPTC has no bearing on training delivery and instead is completely detached from courses provided at these centres. Research tends to focus on abstract concepts of conflict, often unrelated to PSO and poorly researched. Even when research does relate to PSO there is no link to training. A key issue is the perception that research department should deliver academic research consisting of lengthy conceptual papers. This is a 'white elephant'. Research at PSTCs is more akin to applied analysis as opposed to academic publishing. Furthermore research staff within these PSTCs tend to be unqualified for their positions. KAIPTC is an exception with well qualified researchers.

Research needs to inform training delivery. A simple and effective system of research, more akin to policy analysis, is required. It is crucial that research feeds into training and there is a direct link between the two departments. As such a basic system of research can be identified as well as the most useful products. In doing so roles and responsibilities must be clearly outlined.

Research products can include demand led papers, policy notes, policy papers and research papers. Research staff must also be part of almost all strategizing processes in an advisory capacity. Crucially research staff must be part of all writing boards for courses, assist in training aids such as developing case studies for specific modules/case studies and participate in all review and validation processes, again in an advisory capacity. Finally researchers can be subject matter experts from specific modules on courses

where relevant. For instance a researcher with relevant knowledge could present on 'introduction to PSO', 'understanding conflict', case studies and so on, but only if the individual has the requisite expertise. Research products then can include:

**Demand led products** are directly requested by key customers and can take the form of analytical notes, papers or more informal advice such as through meetings and emails. Key customers are the training department and headquarters. If these customers require analytical and intellectual inputs into course delivery or institutional development they can request analysis on specific issues from the research department.

**Policy notes** are perhaps one of the most useful analytical products. These short, concise and policy relevant papers, of around 5 pages, should seek to inform training or institutional development with practical recommendations. For instance a short paper could provide suggestions for specific courses or for the centre's institutional approach.

**Policy papers** are more lengthy analytical products that again must prioritise the practical over the conceptual. These should be more developed versions of policy notes, based on rigorous analysis and research, ideally incorporating data collection from field visits. An example would be a detailed training needs analysis for UN and AU PSO based on research conducted in mission theatres or a paper analysing protection of civilians approaches from different missions, again based in part on field research.

**Research papers** for public consumption should be the least important product. More important is to get training delivery right. However, published research papers can be useful in promoting the centre and building a reputation. At the same time, failure to produce quality research will have a negative reputational effect. The research departments at IPSTC and KAIPTC demonstrate this. KAIPTC's research capacity, although not informing training, is at least of a high standard. AT IPSTC research products are of an extremely poor standard calling into question the utility of research. It is important to stress that while there is an abundance of analysis on peacekeeping and conflict there is a lack of analysis on how these issues feed into PSO training. PSTCs should lead the field in this area. Therefore research topics need to link conflict and peacekeeping to training. Areas for potential research then could analyse different PoC activities, could seek to provide analysis on what training modules are needed for specific deployments and why and so on.

**Other activities** the research department should inform, in collaboration with other departments, are writing boards/course design; delivering specific modules on courses; participating in conferences; conducting research trips; and developing training aids.

The structure of the research department should be subordinate to the training department and other departments. Therefore a small analytical 'cell' would be sufficient for the purposes of the centre, providing in-house expertise. Ideally there should be a head of department supported by three researchers correlating to specific course delivery areas of conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding. In this way a researcher can effectively concentrate on courses within their specialisation. Therefore researchers need to have relevant knowledge/expertise relating to courses provided within the broad areas of training such as conflict prevention activities, and similarly for conflict management and peacebuilding.

It is crucial that the right staff are hired as researchers. Researchers need to be well qualified with both research but crucially policy and PSO experience; either as having participated in a PSO at a senior level or been part of government or international analysis or policy making. Researchers should have a minimum of a Masters degree in relevant subject and at least 5 years relevant professional experience.

The development of the research department should not move faster than the training department. A gradual process of developing research is perhaps the best strategy, with only one dedicated researcher or research analyst needed in initial phases of development. As the RPA develops with more courses there will be a need to expand. Before this happens the utility of research needs to be demonstrated.

### **Admin and Finance Department**

Ensuring quality financial management is the most important step for the expansion of PSTCs in terms of securing external funding and for accreditation to the UN. It is essential that a quality finance department is established that is able to manage budgets effectively and to conduct internal audits. It is equally important to ensure a comprehensive and quality external audit from a reputable international firm.

In addition to financial transparency the admin and finance department should lead on developing an implementing business plans, resource mobilisation strategy and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). SOPs should include a human resources manual and a gender manual as well as organisational practices.

### *Sequencing Organisational Development*

As noted the TPA is in embryonic form. The current organisation as outlined in Annex 1 must be augmented and developed in phases.

The first phase requires the necessary infrastructure to be completed. Although a functional infrastructure for instruction exists such as lecture halls

and classrooms it is essential that accommodation blocks are constructed to provide a 24 hour learning environment and to generate funds through admin costs. Other necessary infrastructure is required such as functioning Wi-Fi throughout the RPA. In addition to developing the infrastructure a critical mass of courses and a basic and predictable yearly curriculum must be established. In order to expand the RPA must be delivering a certain number of courses, with a minimum of 6-10 per year. This phase will require significant external resources but or importantly 'buy-in' to the concept of RPA and its ability to become a regional centre of excellence.

The second phase should see a gradual expansion of the RPA that mirrors an increased number of courses. Staff numbers should increase slowly with only a few extra positions needed to deliver all outputs. The Director should be assisted by a Chief of Staff or senior civilian political adviser with relevant expertise and experience who has oversight of all activities at RPA. Head of department should be supported by a training officer, a curriculum designer and a research analyst as well as admin/finance officer as outlined in Annex

This phase should see the direct influence and ownership of training products at RPA, the institutionalisation of a training system as outlined above and the development of a research strategy that directly impacts on training design and delivery.

A third phase of development should involve a larger expansion of the RPA in terms of courses and staff. The RPA should have established a core curriculum that is augmented by more courses. Significant donor support should be in place through Memorandums of Commitment and an international management board should be established. RPA departments should be fully staffed, as outlined in Annex 3 and SOPs as well as a financial and auditing system should be in place. At this point the RPA will be in a position to seek official accreditation with the UN and AU. At this stage the RPA should have full ownership of its core curriculum as well as a fully functioning system of training and of research.

## **Conclusion**

This policy paper has provided a comparative analysis of the KAIPTC and IPSTC with a view to developing lessons and best practice to inform development of the RPA. A number of lessons can be drawn from comparing these PSTCs.

PSTCs take time and should undertake a gradual process of development in line with the expansion of training outputs, development of infrastructure and the securing of funding. Developing organisational roles and responsibilities are essential as is securing external funding and support. Finally it is crucial to develop quality financial systems including a regular external audit as well as secure accreditation from the UN and AU.

The development of the RPA should follow a phased process of gradual expansion. It is crucial to develop the organisation's senior management. A senior civilian adviser or Chief of Staff is essential to support the Director. The Director, CoS/Adviser and Heads of department should form the nucleus of the RPAs decision-making. In addition the aim should be to establish an international management board inclusive of sponsors, the host nation and key customers.


he RPA needs to develop an effective system of training that is owned by the centre that includes an evaluation mechanism. Staff with relevant expertise and experience as trainers and curriculum designers should be employed to equip the RPA with in-house capacity to design and deliver training courses.

Research should feed into and be subordinate to training. A number of analytical products and inputs should be designed that inform training design and delivery.


A comprehensive and transparent financial system must be established with internal and external auditing. SOPs must also be developed including, the strategic plan, business plan (including a resources mobilisation strategy), human resources and gender manual.

**Dr Marco Jowell**  
**Strategic Adviser & Senior Researcher**  
**RPA**

## Annex 1: Phase 1 - Current RPA Organisation



## Annex 2: Phase 2 - Proposed Next Phased Development of RPA



### Annex 3: Phase 3 - Fully Developed Operational Capacity of RPA

